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Abstract
The face recognition community has finally started pay-
ing more attention to the long-neglected problem of spoof-
ing attacks. The number of countermeasures is gradually
increasing and fairly good results have been reported on the
publicly available databases. There exists no superior anti-
spoofing technique due to the varying nature of attack sce-
narios and acquisition conditions. Therefore, it is important
to find out complementary countermeasures and study how
they should be combined in order to construct an easily ex-
tensible anti-spoofing framework. In this paper, we address
this issue by studying fusion of motion and texture based
countermeasures under several types of scenic face attacks.
We provide an intuitive way to explore the fusion potential
of different visual cues and show that the performance of
the individual methods can be vastly improved by perform-
ing fusion at score level. The Half-Total Error Rate (HTER)
of the best individual countermeasure was decreased from
11.2% to 5.1% on the Replay Attack Database. More impor-
tantly, we question the idea of using complex classification
schemes in individual countermeasures, since nearly same
fusion performance is obtained by replacing them with a
simple linear one. In this manner, the computational effi-
ciency and also probably the generalization ability of the
resulting anti-spoofing framework are increased.
1. Introduction
Face recognition has been an active research area in com-
puter vision research because facial information provides
means for non-intrusive and natural interaction, identity
verification and recognition. Although wide range of view-
points, ageing of subjects and complex outdoor lighting are
still research challenges, face recognition is beginning to be
mature enough for biometric-enabled applications. How-
ever, vulnerability to direct attacks is the most crucial prob-
lem for companies willing to market 2D face based biomet-
ric identity management solutions.
A spoofing attack occurs when a biometric authentica-
tion system is bypassed by falsifying biometric data of a
valid user and presenting the forged trait to the sensor. Com-
pared to other modalities, falsifying face biometric data is
straightforward because no special skills are required. Hid-
ing your face in public is extremely difficult, thus facial in-
formation can be captured even from long distance. Further-
more, a great deal of multimedia content, i.e. photographs
and videos, is openly available in the Internet due to the
increasing popularity of social network websites (facebook,
flickr, youtube, instagram and others). While photo-realistic
masks and plastic surgery remain still rather expensive,
spoofing attacks are usually perpetrated using photographs
and videos of the targeted person because printers and high
definition display devices are very affordable.
Recently, face recognition community has begun to fo-
cus more on the vulnerabilities of face authentication sys-
tems that can be attested in the gradually increasing num-
ber of publicly available databases and developed counter-
measures. Although impressive results have been reported
on individual databases, the varying nature of spoofing at-
tacks and environmental conditions makes it impossible to
predict how single anti-spoofing techniques can generalize
the problem in real-world applications. Moreover, we can-
not foresee all possible attack scenarios and cover them in
databases because the imagination of the human mind al-
ways finds out new tricks to fool existing systems. Thus, we
must constantly keep developing novel countermeasures.
Nevertheless, the security of the current face authenti-
cation systems can be already improved by utilizing exist-
ing countermeasures. A good example of this was the eye
blink detection based liveness check that was introduced to
the Face Unlock feature on Android phones. Although this
simple security update is not capable of dealing with cut-
photo or animated face attacks, it still manages to boost
the robustness to the plain photo-attacks. It is reasonable
to assume that no single superior technique is able to de-
tect all known, let alone unseen, spoofing attacks. However,
an anti-spoofing solution consisting of several complemen-
Figure 1. Examples of real accesses attempts (leftmost column) and corresponding scenic fake face attacks, i.e. face spoof with both face
and background scene, from the Replay-Attack Database [6].
tary countermeasures probably performs more robustly un-
der various fake face attacks. Therefore, it is also impor-
tant to find out which countermeasures are complementary
and how the different techniques should be combined. This
would provide insight on how to construct a flexible anti-
spoofing framework in which new techniques can be easily
integrated. In this manner, the discovered vulnerabilities
could be patched in no time when new countermeasures ap-
pear.
Fusion of multiple visual cues for spoofing detection is
its own research topic but unfortunately it has not been stud-
ied much apart from the methods [20, 23, 24] proposed
within the context of the recently organized IJCB 2011
competition on counter measures to 2D facial spoofing at-
tacks [5]. In this work, we address this issue by analysing
the fusion potential of motion [1] and micro-texture analy-
sis [6, 15] based methods under various scenic face spoof-
ing attacks on the Replay-Attack Database [6] (see Fig. 1).
We show that the two countermeasures are indeed com-
plementary and that their moderate performance can be
vastly improved by performing fusion at score level. More
importantly, we find out that the computational efficiency
and probably also generalization ability of the anti-spoofing
framework can be increased by reducing the complexity of
the individual countermeasures without nearly any trade-off
in the fusion performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 gives on overview of the state-of-the-art countermea-
sures to 2D face spoofing attacks. In Section 3, we intro-
duce the studied countermeasures and the fusion strategy
used in our experiments. In Section 4, we provide the results
of our complementarity analysis and report the resulting fu-
sion performance of the countermeasures. Finally, we con-
clude the paper and discuss directions for future research in
Section 5.
2. Related work
While challenge-response approach [9, 12, 7], multi-
modal analysis [8, 12] and multi-spectral imaging [25, 18,
21] provide efficient means for discriminating real faces
from fake ones, they are also rather impractical due to inter-
action or unconventional imaging requirements. In this sec-
tion, we review only anti-spoofing techniques requiring no
user-cooperation and using conventional imaging systems
because these properties make them appealing to use within
the existing face authentication systems. Another advan-
tage is that usually it is not known which visual cues are
used when the system is harder to deceive.
Typical non-intrusive 2D face anti-spoofing technique is
liveness detection that aims at detecting physiological signs
of life, such as eye blinking, facial expression changes and
mouth movements. For instance Pan et al. [17] exploited
the observation that humans blink once every 2-4 seconds
and used Conditional Random Field (CRF) framework to
model and detect eye blinking. In general, motion analysis
is a commonly used countermeasure since it can be assumed
that the movement of planar objects, e.g. video displays and
photographs, differs significantly from real human faces
which are complex 3D objects. Kollreider et al. [11] pre-
sented an optical-flow based method to capture and track
the subtle movements of different facial parts, assuming
that facial parts in real faces move differently than on pho-
tographs. In another work [4], Bao et al. also used opti-
cal flow based motion estimation for describing the move-
ment of planar objects such as prints or screens. Anjos et
al. [1] presented a countermeasure to scenic face attacks by
measuring the motion correlation between the face and the
background regions through simple frame differences. Even
though motion is an important visual cue, vitality and non-
rigid motion detectors are powerless under video-replay at-
tacks if interaction is not employed.
Another category of anti-spoofing methods are based on
the analysis of skin properties such as reflectance and tex-
ture. Assuming that photographs are usually smaller in size
and they would contain fewer high frequency components
compared to real faces, Li et al. [14] described a method
based on the analysis of 2D Fourier spectra. In a recent
work, Tan et al. [22] considered the Lambertian reflectance
model and extracted two types of latent reflectance features
using a variational retinex-based approach and difference-
of-Gaussians (DoG) filtering to discriminate between the
2D images of face prints and 3D live faces. The aforemen-
tioned approaches may work well for down-sampled photos
but are likely to fail for higher-quality images. Bai et al. [3]
extracted micro-textures from the specularity component of
an image to detect recaptured images. The major drawback
of this method is that it requires high resolution input im-
ages in order to discriminate the fine micro-texture of the
used spoofing medium. Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al. [15] and Chingovska
et al. [6] addressed this issue by exploring the structure of
facial micro-textures using local binary patterns (LBP) [16]
on conventional webcam-quality images. However, the na-
ture of texture patterns varies a lot due to different acqui-
sition conditions and spoofing media, thus diverse datasets
are needed for training the micro-texture based methods.
Recently, Komulainen et al. [13] extended the micro-
texture analysis based spoofing detection into spatiotempo-
ral domain. In addition to analysing the structure of facial
micro-textures, local binary patterns from three orthogonal
planes (LBP-TOP) [26] were applied for describing specific
dynamic events, e.g. facial motion and sudden character-
istic reflections of planar spoofing media, and scenic cues
which might differentiate real faces from fake ones. Similar
visual cue was considered in the work by Pinto et al. [19]
as the dynamic artefacts of display devices were exploited
for detecting video-replay attacks. More specifically, visual
rhythms were computed from the Fourier spectrum of the
extracted video noise signatures and the resulting textural
information was compressed with gray level co-occurrence
matrices (GLCM).
Fusion of anti-spoofing measures has not been studied
much and mainly combination of highly correlated motion
cues [10] has been considered. The algorithms [20, 23, 24]
proposed within the context of the recently organized IJCB
2011 competition on counter measures to 2D facial spoof-
ing attacks [5] were an exception and presented interest-
ing visual cues and fusion strategies. Tronci et al. [23]
and Schwartz et al. [20] were able to obtain impressive
performance using motion and texture information but at
the cost of complexity. In [23], many visual features and
support vector machines (SVM) were needed for detect-
ing simple print-attacks, whereas in [20] temporal infor-
mation from videos was accumulated by concatenating de-
scriptions of individual frames which results in very high-
dimensional feature vectors. Conversely, Yan et al. [24]
wanted to achieve better generalization capabilities and pro-
posed novel liveness clues with clear semantic definitions
in order to avoid just extracting specific feature and training
a ”black box” classifier. However, the algorithm utilized
mainly two uncorrelated motion cues, non-rigid motion and
face-background consistency analysis, while the only spa-
tial cue, banding analysis, was discarded unless uniform
background was observed, since both face and background
regions were used for image quality assessment.
Indeed, many directions for non-intrusive spoofing de-
tection have been already explored but none of them is alone
able to capture the nature of every face spoofing scenario.
Therefore, the problem of spoofing attacks should be broken
down into attack-specific subproblems that can be solved
efficiently with a proper combination of countermeasures.
To follow this principle, we propose fusion of motion and
texture based methods for detecting various scenic face at-
tacks. Furthermore, as computational efficiency is very im-
portant criterion when multiple anti-spoofing measures are
used in parallel, we question the use of complex classifica-
tions schemes on individual countermeasures.
3. Detecting scenic fake face attacks
In addition to the used spoofing medium type, such as
photograph and video display, 2D fake face attacks can be
categorized into two groups, close-up and scenic attacks,
based on how the fake face is represented with the spoofing
medium. Both types of 2D face spoofs have common and,
more importantly, their own distinctive visual cues that can
be exploited in spoofing detection schemes.
A close-up spoof describes only the facial area which is
presented to the sensor. The main weakness with the tightly
cropped fake spoofs is that the boundaries of the spoofing
medium, e.g. a video screen frame, photograph edges, or
the attacker’s hands are usually visible during the attack,
thus can be detected in the scene [13]. However, these vi-
sual cues can be hidden by incorporating background scene
in the face spoof and placing the resulting scenic face spoof
very near to the sensor. Fortunately, the proximity between
the spoofing medium and the camera might cause the recap-
tured face image to be out-of-focus and reveal also other fa-
cial texture quality issues, like degradation due to the used
spoofing medium. Furthermore, for stationary systems, it
should be possible to observe high correlation between the
overall motion of the face and the background regions.
In this work, we concentrate on detecting scenic spoofing
attacks by exploiting the aforementioned two visual cues.
More specifically, we study more closely the fusion of two
recently proposed countermeasures based on motion [1] and
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Figure 2. Block diagram of the used fusion strategy.
micro-texture analysis [6, 15] that have individually shown
moderate discriminative power.
3.1. Motion correlation analysis
Anjos and Marcel [1] proposed a straightforward
motion-based anti-spoofing technique to measure the cor-
relations between the client head movements and the back-
ground scene. The main idea of the algorithm is to ignore
the direction of the movements and focus only on intensity
information. Thus, an area-normalized sum of the frame-
difference is computed separately for both regions to form
two signal patterns that describe the total motion within the
regions. The resulting motion signals are divided into time
windows of N frames from which five quantities are ex-
tracted to form a compact motion representation. A multi-
layer perceptron (MLP) classifier is then used for evaluating
whether excessive motion (hand-held attack) or no move-
ment (fixed support photo-attack) is observed during the
time window of N frames.
3.2. Facial texture analysis
Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al. [15] and Chingovska et al. [6] found
that degradation in facial skin texture quality and dispar-
ities in reflectance properties can be captured by analysing
facial micro-textures using local binary patterns (LBP) [16].
More specifically, uniform patterns (LBPu2) were consid-
ered when only the labels which contain at most two 0-1
or 1-0 transitions are utilized instead of all possible LBP
codes. Like in [6, 15], we describe the facial texture prop-
erties by computing LBP over normalized face of 64 × 64
pixels. However, we extract only the global description of
the facial texture using LBPu28,1 operator instead of dividing
the face into several blocks. The resulting 59-bin feature
histogram is then fed to a support vector machine (SVM)
classifier that decides whether the texture description corre-
sponds to the properties of genuine face or not.
3.3. Fusion strategies
The motion correlation analysis based technique is effi-
cient for measuring synchronized shaking of hand-held at-
tacks within the scene. However, a drawback is that it can
get confused between a fixed support photo-attack and a
motionless person while being recognized [1]. Moreover,
the method was originally proposed for detecting photo-
attacks, while the assumption of decorrelated movement
between face and background is unfortunately true also in
case of video replay-attacks. On the other hand, the per-
formance of LBP based countermeasures is not dependent
on the spoofing attack scenario if disparities in the facial
texture properties exist. More importantly, the two counter-
measures exploit independent visual cues, motion and tex-
ture, thus intuitively they should be able to provide comple-
mentary information about the nature of the observed access
attempt.
The environmental conditions and possible spoofing sce-
narios are unpredictable in real world applications. It can be
assumed that the generalization ability and stability of the
individual countermeasures could be improved by reduc-
ing the complexity of individual countermeasures. Thus,
we also considered to utilize linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) instead of the complex classifiers (MLP and SVM)
used in the original methods to avoid overfitting and possi-
bly increasing robustness in real-world applications.
The block diagram of the proposed fusion strategy is
illustrated in Fig 2. In order to combine the motion
and micro-texture analysis based techniques, the video se-
quences are divided into overlapping windows of N frames
with an overlap of N-1 frames and each observation gener-
ates an independent score of the rest of the video sequence.
For the sake of simplicity, the LBP based face description is
computed only for the last frame, whereas the five quantities
are extracted over the whole time window for evaluating the
motion correlation as in [1]. The fusion of the two visual
cues is then performed at score level using linear logistic
regression (LLR).
Motion LBP Mutual
Devel 11.13 14.72 2.25
Test 12.22 12.51 1.37
Table 1. Overall error rates (%) of time windows for individual
methods with complex classifiers (MLP for motion and SVM for
LBP) compared to the percentage of mutual errors over all sam-
ples.
Motion LBP Mutual
Devel 15.16 19.07 2.27
Test 16.89 15.69 1.76
Table 2. Overall error rates (%) of time windows for individual
methods with LDA classifier compared to the percentage of mutual
errors over all samples.
The proposed anti-spoofing framework was imple-
mented using the free signal processing and machine learn-
ing toolbox Bob [2]. The source code of the fusion algo-
rithm1 as well as the individual countermeasures (motion2
and texture3) are available as add-on packages to this frame-
work. After installation, it is possible to reproduce all re-
ported experiments.
4. Experimental analysis
In this section, we provide an in-depth analysis on com-
bining the motion and micro-texture analysis based counter-
measures. The experiments are conducted on the Replay-
Attack database4 consisting of several types of scenic
spoofing attacks. The database is divided into three non-
overlapping subsets for training, development and testing
the countermeasures. The training set is used for training
the countermeasure, whereas the development set operates
as a separate validation set for estimating a threshold value
to be used on the test set. The database protocol defines the
Equal Error Rate (EER) as a decision threshold. The ac-
tual test set is used only to report results. As performance
measure, the protocol suggests to report the Half-Total Er-
ror Rate (HTER) on the test data.
The purpose of our experimental analysis is to first deter-
mine if the two countermeasures have fusion potential and
then see what is the actual fusion performance under scenic
spoofing attacks. More importantly, we study how the re-
duced complexity of the individual methods affects the per-
formance of the anti-spoofing framework. To be consistent
with the experiments in [1], we fixed the window size N at
20 frames which represents roughly a second in video time.
1http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.fusion
2http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.motion
3http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbp
4http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
4.1. Fusion potential analysis
The complementarity of different countermeasures
should be determined before blindly trying fusion. There-
fore, we considered a set of total errors for each individual
anti-spoofing technique and applied mutual error analysis
on the two error sets in order to determine the number of
samples that both countermeasures fail to recognize.
Table 1 and Table 2 present the total error rates for time
windows of 20 frames using the original and simplified clas-
sification schemes of the individual countermeasures and
the portion of their mutual mistakes. As we can see, the
percentage of common errors is extremely low compared to
the moderate accuracy of the individual methods. Further-
more, the LDA outputs of the two techniques with a LLR
decision boundary are visualized in Fig. 3. The scatter plot
depicts that an increased linear separability can be obtained
by combining the two visual cues. These observations indi-
cate that the motion and LBP based countermeasures are in-
deed complementary, thus the fusion of these anti-spoofing
approaches should improve robustness to scenic attacks.
It is also important to notice that only a minor increase
from 1.37% to 1.76% in the number of mutual errors is ob-
served when LDA is used on individual countermeasures to
reduce complexity even if the individual performances de-
grade substantially. Since the fusion potential is unaffected
by the proposed simplification, the use of LDA is consid-
ered also in the following experiments.
Figure 3. Scatter plot of the two countermeasures with LLR deci-
sion boundary.
4.2. Fusion results using independent observations
Now, we perform fusion at score level in order to find out
the actual benefit that we gain by combining motion correla-
tion and LBP based countermeasures. The overall accuracy
for time windows is shown in Table 3. The results sup-
Devel Test
Method Complex LDA Complex LDA
Motion 11.13 15.16 11.2 16.05
LBP 14.72 19.08 15.06 17.12
LLR 4.57 5.48 5.11 5.47
Table 3. Overall performance (HTER in %) for time windows.
Complex classifiers means that MLP is used for motion correla-
tion and SVM for LBP based method.
port our complementary hypotheses as significant perfor-
mance enhancement is obtained when both techniques are
used together. For example, the HTER of motion correla-
tion based approach can be improved from 11.20% to 5.1%
by utilizing also the LBP based face description. Moreover,
the simplification of classification schemes reduces the per-
formance of the individual methods whereas the fusion per-
formance remains nearly the same. This observation is also
consistent with our mutual error analysis, thus suggesting
that the complementarity of countermeasures is somewhat
independent of the complexity of the individual classifica-
tion techniques.
4.3. Access attempt based analysis
So far, we classified the individual time windows of
20 frames without exploiting the temporal dimension of
the video sequences. In this section, we determine the
video-based performance of the proposed spoofing detec-
tion scheme by accumulating the fused scores of classified
time windows as time passes.
Fig 4 describes the HTER evolution of access attempt
based performance on the test set using the same threshold
as in Section 4.2. As expected, LBP based countermea-
sure does not benefit much from the temporal processing
because it is not able to exploit the available motion in-
formation. On the other hand, the motion based technique
gains a huge performance boost because people tend to start
moving more in front of the camera as time passes, thus re-
ducing the false rejection rate as the amount of decorrelated
movement increases in the scene.
Fusion always outperforms the individual countermea-
sures. However, it is interesting to notice that the HTER
of combination of LDA-based classifiers drops much faster
and saturates within 75 frames (three seconds in video
time), whereas it takes more than 100 frames (four seconds
in video time) when the outputs of more complex classi-
fication schemes are combined. Furthermore, the simpli-
fied anti-spoofing framework actually works significantly
better when spoofing decision is made within 100 frames.
This gives another good reason to consider the use of less
complex classification schemes in addition to their compu-
tational simplicity.
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Figure 4. HTER (%) evolution of the individual countermeasures
and their fusion (video based analysis).
5. Conclusion
No existing anti-spoofing technique is able to detect all
types of attacks, thus it is important to find out complemen-
tary countermeasures and study how they should be com-
bined in order to construct an easily extensible anti-spoofing
framework. In this work, we addressed this issue by study-
ing fusion of motion and texture based countermeasures un-
der several types of scenic fake face attacks. We explored
the fusion potential of different anti-spoofing techniques by
performing mutual error analysis. The total error rates of
the individual methods were over 12% whereas the per-
centage of mutual errors was below 2% suggesting that the
countermeasures are indeed complementary. The actual fu-
sion results were coherent with our mutual errors analysis
since the unsatisfying performance of the two individual
techniques was significantly improved (from 11.2% to 5.1%
in terms of HTER) when performing fusion at score level.
The use of simpler linear classification scheme on indi-
vidual countermeasures was also studied. When the origi-
nal complex classifiers were replaced with LDA, the perfor-
mance of individual methods degraded substantially. How-
ever, the number of mutual errors increased only from 1.4%
to 1.8% and the HTER of the fusion performance from
5.1% to 5.5%, thus indicating that the complementarity of
countermeasures is somewhat independent of the complex-
ity of the individual classification techniques. Furthermore,
the access attempt based analysis revealed that the perfor-
mance of the simplified anti-spoofing framework actually
converged faster when temporal information was accumu-
lated. Since the generalization ability of very complex clas-
sification schemes can be questioned and the gain in fusion
performance on databases is very small, the use of simple
and computationally efficient classifiers should be indeed
considered when constructing real-world anti-spoofing so-
lutions.
In future, we plan to increase the number of countermea-
sures and fusion techniques in the anti-spoofing framework
because interesting approaches have been introduced very
recently. For instance the use of dynamic texture has shown
to be effective in describing the differences between real
faces and fake ones. In addition, we will focus on study-
ing the generalization capabilities of the individual counter-
measures and their fusion using cross-database testing. Es-
pecially the effectiveness of different classification schemes
on individual countermeasures and fusion strategies will be
evaluated more closely.
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